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	<title>Comments on: The fun part – assigning blame</title>
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	<description>China's financial and monetary links to the world</description>
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		<title>By: Personal Effects &#187; Blog Archive &#187; lets arrest all the professional forecasters who get it wrong too</title>
		<link>http://mpettis.com/2009/01/168/comment-page-1/#comment-461</link>
		<dc:creator>Personal Effects &#187; Blog Archive &#187; lets arrest all the professional forecasters who get it wrong too</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 10 Jan 2009 05:28:09 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://mpettis.com/?p=168#comment-461</guid>
		<description>[...] 3.The fun part – assigning blame [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] 3.The fun part – assigning blame [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Leon</title>
		<link>http://mpettis.com/2009/01/168/comment-page-1/#comment-460</link>
		<dc:creator>Leon</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 09 Jan 2009 21:45:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://mpettis.com/?p=168#comment-460</guid>
		<description>curt,

what you posted was interesting. 

I think the trade imbalance will be resolved very soon by this US recession.

Nov China&#039;s export was -2.2%. although import was -17.9%, it was mostly due to falling comdty prices. however, comdty prices have stablized since then. Dec or 1Q09 will mark the first time China sees a shrinkage in trade balance. 

esp, now comdty seems to be the place to invest and given the size of all the infra projects in stimulus pkges worldwide. prices are likely to rise. 

if by then US is running at a 9% unemployment. China&#039;s export will still be in trouble, and china will see hot money, investment net outflow. b/c USA will be the ideal place for investors. 

in addition, when US sees that 9% unemployment rate, what will China&#039;s unemployment rate be? my wild guess would be &gt;20% in urban area and much much bigger in rural. 

according to many broker&#039;s report on money flows in the recent months, outflow is in all developing and emerging countries. USA is the country sees the most inflow.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>curt,</p>
<p>what you posted was interesting. </p>
<p>I think the trade imbalance will be resolved very soon by this US recession.</p>
<p>Nov China&#8217;s export was -2.2%. although import was -17.9%, it was mostly due to falling comdty prices. however, comdty prices have stablized since then. Dec or 1Q09 will mark the first time China sees a shrinkage in trade balance. </p>
<p>esp, now comdty seems to be the place to invest and given the size of all the infra projects in stimulus pkges worldwide. prices are likely to rise. </p>
<p>if by then US is running at a 9% unemployment. China&#8217;s export will still be in trouble, and china will see hot money, investment net outflow. b/c USA will be the ideal place for investors. </p>
<p>in addition, when US sees that 9% unemployment rate, what will China&#8217;s unemployment rate be? my wild guess would be &gt;20% in urban area and much much bigger in rural. </p>
<p>according to many broker&#8217;s report on money flows in the recent months, outflow is in all developing and emerging countries. USA is the country sees the most inflow.</p>
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		<title>By: HZ</title>
		<link>http://mpettis.com/2009/01/168/comment-page-1/#comment-459</link>
		<dc:creator>HZ</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 09 Jan 2009 21:10:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://mpettis.com/?p=168#comment-459</guid>
		<description>Michael, 
Wonderful piece! Almost forgot how much fun it was to sit in your classroom...</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Michael,<br />
Wonderful piece! Almost forgot how much fun it was to sit in your classroom&#8230;</p>
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		<title>By: Estragon</title>
		<link>http://mpettis.com/2009/01/168/comment-page-1/#comment-458</link>
		<dc:creator>Estragon</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 09 Jan 2009 21:09:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://mpettis.com/?p=168#comment-458</guid>
		<description>I&#039;m forced to agree that excess liquidity is a necessary but not sufficient condition in the formation of (damaging) bubbles.  Of course, that agreement is subject to definition of &quot;excess liquidity&quot; and &quot;bubbles&quot;.

In a sense, an excess of liquidity has historically been present more often than not.  Were that not the case, the prices of goods and services (both current and future) would drop moderately over time (roughly in line with productivity increases).  Further, bubbles (being a condition in which demand moves positively with price, rather than the more normal inverse) are forming more often than not as the &quot;excess&quot; liquidity sloshes about between targets and durations.

Generally speaking, this sloshing about sets up economic ripples which are out of phase, and the sloshing is self-canceling.  Every so often though, waves end up being in phase, which is what we&#039;re seeing today.  Correlations which are ordinarily negative suddenly become positive.  Self-limiting cycles become self-reinforcing.  What formerly appeared linear becomes non-linear.  

Assigning blame to a particular wave is pointless, since it&#039;s  the interaction of the waves that causes the problem, not the waves themselves.  

What we really need is a better understanding of why and how liquidity bubbles become the equivalent of in-phase waves.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I&#8217;m forced to agree that excess liquidity is a necessary but not sufficient condition in the formation of (damaging) bubbles.  Of course, that agreement is subject to definition of &#8220;excess liquidity&#8221; and &#8220;bubbles&#8221;.</p>
<p>In a sense, an excess of liquidity has historically been present more often than not.  Were that not the case, the prices of goods and services (both current and future) would drop moderately over time (roughly in line with productivity increases).  Further, bubbles (being a condition in which demand moves positively with price, rather than the more normal inverse) are forming more often than not as the &#8220;excess&#8221; liquidity sloshes about between targets and durations.</p>
<p>Generally speaking, this sloshing about sets up economic ripples which are out of phase, and the sloshing is self-canceling.  Every so often though, waves end up being in phase, which is what we&#8217;re seeing today.  Correlations which are ordinarily negative suddenly become positive.  Self-limiting cycles become self-reinforcing.  What formerly appeared linear becomes non-linear.  </p>
<p>Assigning blame to a particular wave is pointless, since it&#8217;s  the interaction of the waves that causes the problem, not the waves themselves.  </p>
<p>What we really need is a better understanding of why and how liquidity bubbles become the equivalent of in-phase waves.</p>
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		<title>By: Estragon</title>
		<link>http://mpettis.com/2009/01/168/comment-page-1/#comment-457</link>
		<dc:creator>Estragon</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 09 Jan 2009 20:43:35 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://mpettis.com/?p=168#comment-457</guid>
		<description>Nyet,

Extending your driving analogy, the problem with speed limits is they concentrate thinking on the wrong idea.  Speed doesn&#039;t hurt anyone much.  It&#039;s the sudden stopping that does all the damage.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Nyet,</p>
<p>Extending your driving analogy, the problem with speed limits is they concentrate thinking on the wrong idea.  Speed doesn&#8217;t hurt anyone much.  It&#8217;s the sudden stopping that does all the damage.</p>
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		<title>By: nyet</title>
		<link>http://mpettis.com/2009/01/168/comment-page-1/#comment-454</link>
		<dc:creator>nyet</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 08 Jan 2009 19:59:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://mpettis.com/?p=168#comment-454</guid>
		<description>Great blog contribution to the current debate. I disagree strongly on the efficacy of regulation.

I think you are confusing bankers try to circumvent regulation with regulatory ineffectiveness.

This can be seen clearly with a driving analogy.

You could make the argument that since drivers will try to avoid speed limits, one shouldn&#039;t have them. 

I think most of us would prefer driving on roads with speed limits!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Great blog contribution to the current debate. I disagree strongly on the efficacy of regulation.</p>
<p>I think you are confusing bankers try to circumvent regulation with regulatory ineffectiveness.</p>
<p>This can be seen clearly with a driving analogy.</p>
<p>You could make the argument that since drivers will try to avoid speed limits, one shouldn&#8217;t have them. </p>
<p>I think most of us would prefer driving on roads with speed limits!</p>
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		<title>By: TradingSpark</title>
		<link>http://mpettis.com/2009/01/168/comment-page-1/#comment-453</link>
		<dc:creator>TradingSpark</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 08 Jan 2009 16:18:50 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://mpettis.com/?p=168#comment-453</guid>
		<description>Speaking of blame and regulators ... there is one thing that might be laid at the feet of certain officials and that is the lifting of caps on dealer/broker leverage. The SEC lifted the limit in 2004 when it was argued they were not necessary. (The argument against the limits had apparently previously been put forward by a Mr. Hank Paulson in 2000, when he was then heading up GS - but, it knocked back on that occasion because it was considered &quot;unsafe&quot;.)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Speaking of blame and regulators &#8230; there is one thing that might be laid at the feet of certain officials and that is the lifting of caps on dealer/broker leverage. The SEC lifted the limit in 2004 when it was argued they were not necessary. (The argument against the limits had apparently previously been put forward by a Mr. Hank Paulson in 2000, when he was then heading up GS &#8211; but, it knocked back on that occasion because it was considered &#8220;unsafe&#8221;.)</p>
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		<title>By: W</title>
		<link>http://mpettis.com/2009/01/168/comment-page-1/#comment-452</link>
		<dc:creator>W</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 08 Jan 2009 09:19:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://mpettis.com/?p=168#comment-452</guid>
		<description>One comment with respect to the private/public pay/prestige angle in China. Overall it probably works better to have outrageous pay packages that are publicly disclosed, otherwise bureacrats and officers compensate themselves in non-transparent ways that skim off or otherwise distort company asset structures. This does not mean that they take excessive risks in a financial sense (as in the US), rather they take what amount to large political risks to gain control of resources. Financial resources follow political capital. 

The broader point referenced above with respect to China is the politicization of financial flows in China, which has produced distortions that, in concert with different excesses in the US produced such large bilateral imbalances.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>One comment with respect to the private/public pay/prestige angle in China. Overall it probably works better to have outrageous pay packages that are publicly disclosed, otherwise bureacrats and officers compensate themselves in non-transparent ways that skim off or otherwise distort company asset structures. This does not mean that they take excessive risks in a financial sense (as in the US), rather they take what amount to large political risks to gain control of resources. Financial resources follow political capital. </p>
<p>The broader point referenced above with respect to China is the politicization of financial flows in China, which has produced distortions that, in concert with different excesses in the US produced such large bilateral imbalances.</p>
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		<title>By: W</title>
		<link>http://mpettis.com/2009/01/168/comment-page-1/#comment-451</link>
		<dc:creator>W</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 08 Jan 2009 08:20:16 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://mpettis.com/?p=168#comment-451</guid>
		<description>Your explaination of the underlying monetary mechanisms are very interesting. I am wondering how you might contrast the recent past with the years that gave rise to the idea of the &quot;great moderation&quot;. The growth in liquidity/leverage was accompanied by a long decline in the level and volatility in interest rates in major economies. Then, boom, the coin flips, the tendency changes. Are the coming years going to be the antithesis of the &quot;great moderation&quot; - rising interest rates and more volatility over time?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Your explaination of the underlying monetary mechanisms are very interesting. I am wondering how you might contrast the recent past with the years that gave rise to the idea of the &#8220;great moderation&#8221;. The growth in liquidity/leverage was accompanied by a long decline in the level and volatility in interest rates in major economies. Then, boom, the coin flips, the tendency changes. Are the coming years going to be the antithesis of the &#8220;great moderation&#8221; &#8211; rising interest rates and more volatility over time?</p>
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		<title>By: Twofish</title>
		<link>http://mpettis.com/2009/01/168/comment-page-1/#comment-450</link>
		<dc:creator>Twofish</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 08 Jan 2009 07:29:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://mpettis.com/?p=168#comment-450</guid>
		<description>The other problem with a bank is that if people think that you aren&#039;t going to do a bailout if things get really bad, and it looks like things are going to get really bad, then the logical thing to do at that point is to take out all of their money which then kills the bank.

One problem is that a lot of models of risk assume that people will be willing to accept more risk for more return, when in some situations they won&#039;t.  If I thought that my bank had a 5% chance of going under tomorrow and I had no FDIC insurance, then I&#039;m not going to be happy if the bank promises to pay me 15% interest since 15% of nothing is nothing.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The other problem with a bank is that if people think that you aren&#8217;t going to do a bailout if things get really bad, and it looks like things are going to get really bad, then the logical thing to do at that point is to take out all of their money which then kills the bank.</p>
<p>One problem is that a lot of models of risk assume that people will be willing to accept more risk for more return, when in some situations they won&#8217;t.  If I thought that my bank had a 5% chance of going under tomorrow and I had no FDIC insurance, then I&#8217;m not going to be happy if the bank promises to pay me 15% interest since 15% of nothing is nothing.</p>
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