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	<title>Comments on: Should China Devalue the Yuan?</title>
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	<description>China's financial and monetary links to the world</description>
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		<title>By: Securities Investments - The Blog Planet</title>
		<link>http://mpettis.com/2009/02/should-china-devalue-the-yuan/comment-page-1/#comment-2266</link>
		<dc:creator>Securities Investments - The Blog Planet</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 26 Jun 2009 10:42:58 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>[...] Should China Devalue the Yuan? [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] Should China Devalue the Yuan? [...]</p>
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		<title>By: isaac</title>
		<link>http://mpettis.com/2009/02/should-china-devalue-the-yuan/comment-page-1/#comment-918</link>
		<dc:creator>isaac</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 02 Mar 2009 10:49:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://mpettis.com/?p=301#comment-918</guid>
		<description>China is effectively pegging USD for time being, and leaving the decision on Rmb to fundamentals or USA, which I think is the right thing to do, Rmb-USD peg functioned very much like a automatic stabilizer.

1. If US fail to stabilize the financial system and revitalize growth, FED have to resort to massive QE or directly monetarizing treasuries,  then gradual weakening of USD should bring RMB down together, and China should keep Rmb pegging reflecting the worsening external environment??

2. If China/USA succeeded in reflating domestic demand through fiscal stimulus-monetary easing,  there should be a rebound of China domestic dmmand vs. external, rising import prices vs. export, which should reduce China surging Current account surplus. If some months by 2010 China begin to see trade surplus dropping 50% or more from current USD30B/month pace. coupled with capital flow, FOREX RESERVE SHOULD drop, then China have perfect logic-fundametnals to depeg Rmb-USD and devalue?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>China is effectively pegging USD for time being, and leaving the decision on Rmb to fundamentals or USA, which I think is the right thing to do, Rmb-USD peg functioned very much like a automatic stabilizer.</p>
<p>1. If US fail to stabilize the financial system and revitalize growth, FED have to resort to massive QE or directly monetarizing treasuries,  then gradual weakening of USD should bring RMB down together, and China should keep Rmb pegging reflecting the worsening external environment??</p>
<p>2. If China/USA succeeded in reflating domestic demand through fiscal stimulus-monetary easing,  there should be a rebound of China domestic dmmand vs. external, rising import prices vs. export, which should reduce China surging Current account surplus. If some months by 2010 China begin to see trade surplus dropping 50% or more from current USD30B/month pace. coupled with capital flow, FOREX RESERVE SHOULD drop, then China have perfect logic-fundametnals to depeg Rmb-USD and devalue?</p>
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		<title>By: mannfm11</title>
		<link>http://mpettis.com/2009/02/should-china-devalue-the-yuan/comment-page-1/#comment-915</link>
		<dc:creator>mannfm11</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 01 Mar 2009 23:55:59 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://mpettis.com/?p=301#comment-915</guid>
		<description>There seems to be a confusion as to what savings is. I have a problem believing that a country that is building skyscrapers and pays it general employees saves much of anything on a per person basis, but in the general sense of business may save a huge amount due to the fact that the price advantage flows to the top and not the worker.  The other side of this coin is that in a financial system savings and debt are equal.  Japan, which had a huge savings rate went into deflation due to excessive debt.  Who had the debt?  The businesses and the borrowers in housing and other real estate took on the debt.  Thus we had a system of asset inflation that imploded on itself.  How can anything be saved when it is loaned to another to spend?  What has driven the Chinese economy and the world economy for decades is the United States credit machine.  One can point a finger at the US, but the last 8 years or so was just the final lap in a natural race against time.  The asset bubble in the US was so huge that the stock market peak of 2000 was a relative 250% of the 1929 and 1966 peaks and thus should have imploded the world economy then.  Is it the fault of the US that the system was set up in a fashion that would eventually bankrupt it,but in the meantime collateralize trade around the world?  The securitization and subprime games had already been set in motion in 2000 by one Robert Rubin, formerly of Goldman Sachs, the Secretary of Treasury then as a benefit of his services, employed at a high salary by Citicorp, the biggest financial black hole in the world.  The band played on while the ship was sinking.  At any point, had they put an end to this procedure, the world would have most likely entered depression.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There seems to be a confusion as to what savings is. I have a problem believing that a country that is building skyscrapers and pays it general employees saves much of anything on a per person basis, but in the general sense of business may save a huge amount due to the fact that the price advantage flows to the top and not the worker.  The other side of this coin is that in a financial system savings and debt are equal.  Japan, which had a huge savings rate went into deflation due to excessive debt.  Who had the debt?  The businesses and the borrowers in housing and other real estate took on the debt.  Thus we had a system of asset inflation that imploded on itself.  How can anything be saved when it is loaned to another to spend?  What has driven the Chinese economy and the world economy for decades is the United States credit machine.  One can point a finger at the US, but the last 8 years or so was just the final lap in a natural race against time.  The asset bubble in the US was so huge that the stock market peak of 2000 was a relative 250% of the 1929 and 1966 peaks and thus should have imploded the world economy then.  Is it the fault of the US that the system was set up in a fashion that would eventually bankrupt it,but in the meantime collateralize trade around the world?  The securitization and subprime games had already been set in motion in 2000 by one Robert Rubin, formerly of Goldman Sachs, the Secretary of Treasury then as a benefit of his services, employed at a high salary by Citicorp, the biggest financial black hole in the world.  The band played on while the ship was sinking.  At any point, had they put an end to this procedure, the world would have most likely entered depression.</p>
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		<title>By: mannfm11</title>
		<link>http://mpettis.com/2009/02/should-china-devalue-the-yuan/comment-page-1/#comment-914</link>
		<dc:creator>mannfm11</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 01 Mar 2009 23:39:51 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://mpettis.com/?p=301#comment-914</guid>
		<description>This really begs the question of whether a country reduces the value of it currency to expand demand or their companies reduce their prices.  What would clearly be a short term solution to the trade deficit would be a sizable reduction in the value of the yuan, which in light of falling demand would trim the surplus.  The problem in this world is everyone wants to maintain the status quo, which is defacto bankruptcy while pretending the world still has the purchasing power it had, no one giving anything up.  Either we are going to have to come to grips with the fact that the entire system is bankrupt and rule on what the losses are going to be and go forward or we are in for a long depression and most likely trade wars as well.  The US, with its reserve currency status has benefitted in an increase in purchasing power over the years, but has been put out as a sitting duck in trade relations.  Reserve currencies are world units of trade and without strict debt limit create unsustainable trade imbalances.  The great secret is the debt bubble is worldwide and that the dollar is used as currency indirectly around the world.  The story is the dollars in China are put into bonds, but in truth the bonds are used by the CCB in the same fashion they are used at the Federal Reserve and a slow down in the accumulation of them would put a stop to the easy expansion of credit in China.  Thus the US and China offload inflation on each other, which in the end results in excess debt and more deflation.  Playing games with numbers cannot solve this mess.  You have an interesting spin on who will wage the trade war and I believe it is maybe the greatest insight I have read on the subject yet and will be included in my thinking going forward.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This really begs the question of whether a country reduces the value of it currency to expand demand or their companies reduce their prices.  What would clearly be a short term solution to the trade deficit would be a sizable reduction in the value of the yuan, which in light of falling demand would trim the surplus.  The problem in this world is everyone wants to maintain the status quo, which is defacto bankruptcy while pretending the world still has the purchasing power it had, no one giving anything up.  Either we are going to have to come to grips with the fact that the entire system is bankrupt and rule on what the losses are going to be and go forward or we are in for a long depression and most likely trade wars as well.  The US, with its reserve currency status has benefitted in an increase in purchasing power over the years, but has been put out as a sitting duck in trade relations.  Reserve currencies are world units of trade and without strict debt limit create unsustainable trade imbalances.  The great secret is the debt bubble is worldwide and that the dollar is used as currency indirectly around the world.  The story is the dollars in China are put into bonds, but in truth the bonds are used by the CCB in the same fashion they are used at the Federal Reserve and a slow down in the accumulation of them would put a stop to the easy expansion of credit in China.  Thus the US and China offload inflation on each other, which in the end results in excess debt and more deflation.  Playing games with numbers cannot solve this mess.  You have an interesting spin on who will wage the trade war and I believe it is maybe the greatest insight I have read on the subject yet and will be included in my thinking going forward.</p>
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		<title>By: Michael</title>
		<link>http://mpettis.com/2009/02/should-china-devalue-the-yuan/comment-page-1/#comment-789</link>
		<dc:creator>Michael</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 21 Feb 2009 06:50:54 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://mpettis.com/?p=301#comment-789</guid>
		<description>Charles, China is a very poor country (not even among the top 100 on a per capita basis) so I am not sure how it can give everyone a six-week paid vacation, let alone a six-month paid vacation, but I certainly agree that China would be much better off in the medium term if wages were to rise, especially in the rural areas.  By the way one great positive of the Hu administration versus the Jiang administration is the greater focus on raising rural incomes.  They are still growing more slowly than urban incomes but the differential has narrowed sharply.

Lark, there are a number of policies: raise the value of the currency, raise minimum wages, permit workers to organize, raise interest rates, liberalize banking and capital markets, divert greater funding into services and the private sector, extend retail insurance, improve health care pensions, and many others.  The problem with all of these, of course, is that many involve short-term pain and all the benefits only occur in the long term.  If China were to embark on these it would need to work with the US and Europe to minimize the short term pain – mainly by getting guarantees that they would do nothing to constrain Chinese exports.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Charles, China is a very poor country (not even among the top 100 on a per capita basis) so I am not sure how it can give everyone a six-week paid vacation, let alone a six-month paid vacation, but I certainly agree that China would be much better off in the medium term if wages were to rise, especially in the rural areas.  By the way one great positive of the Hu administration versus the Jiang administration is the greater focus on raising rural incomes.  They are still growing more slowly than urban incomes but the differential has narrowed sharply.</p>
<p>Lark, there are a number of policies: raise the value of the currency, raise minimum wages, permit workers to organize, raise interest rates, liberalize banking and capital markets, divert greater funding into services and the private sector, extend retail insurance, improve health care pensions, and many others.  The problem with all of these, of course, is that many involve short-term pain and all the benefits only occur in the long term.  If China were to embark on these it would need to work with the US and Europe to minimize the short term pain – mainly by getting guarantees that they would do nothing to constrain Chinese exports.</p>
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		<title>By: Michael</title>
		<link>http://mpettis.com/2009/02/should-china-devalue-the-yuan/comment-page-1/#comment-788</link>
		<dc:creator>Michael</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 21 Feb 2009 06:50:29 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://mpettis.com/?p=301#comment-788</guid>
		<description>RebelEconomist, I share your frustration with the slow pace at which the US is moving away from areas in which is simply does not have a competitive advantage (and Europe even more), but I guess the political reality is that there will always be opposition to the short-term pain this transition entails, and in a world of rising unemployment this is even more likely to be true.  Still, as long as a country’s macro policies are aimed at encouraging production and constraining consumption, it will tend to overcapacity (especially, I would argue, when its working population is growing so much faster than its total population, process that will reverse itself in the next few years) and while this is fine in a world of buoyant demand, under current conditions it cannot help.  China needs to change its development model, if for no other reason than to protect itself from over reliance on a perpetual US consumption binge.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>RebelEconomist, I share your frustration with the slow pace at which the US is moving away from areas in which is simply does not have a competitive advantage (and Europe even more), but I guess the political reality is that there will always be opposition to the short-term pain this transition entails, and in a world of rising unemployment this is even more likely to be true.  Still, as long as a country’s macro policies are aimed at encouraging production and constraining consumption, it will tend to overcapacity (especially, I would argue, when its working population is growing so much faster than its total population, process that will reverse itself in the next few years) and while this is fine in a world of buoyant demand, under current conditions it cannot help.  China needs to change its development model, if for no other reason than to protect itself from over reliance on a perpetual US consumption binge.</p>
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		<title>By: Michael</title>
		<link>http://mpettis.com/2009/02/should-china-devalue-the-yuan/comment-page-1/#comment-787</link>
		<dc:creator>Michael</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 21 Feb 2009 06:50:09 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://mpettis.com/?p=301#comment-787</guid>
		<description>Tyaresun, I think in the short run deflation is almost a foregone conclusion, although I think whether or not it is in the longer run depends on the robustness of the financial system and on PBoC polices.  I am not sure devaluation will have much impact on deflation.  I am not smart enough to agree or disagree with Krugman’s argument, but I would say that there is certainly a very strong perception that protection might boost the domestic economy in the short term, and as far as I am concerned it doesn’t matter to China if this perception is right or wrong.  What matters is whether or not there will be moves towards protection.

Seatrus, I am not sure what you mean by overcapacity in the US.  As far as the global balance of payments goes the US is not an overcapacity country.  I am pretty sure that US and European policymakers are not worried about the RMB achieving reserve status, and I am very sure they would not be willing to see domestic unemployment rise to prevent that.  The RMB is very unlikely to become a reserve currency in the next few decades for a wide variety of factors.  For some reason a lot of people in Asia are obsessed with the importance of reserve currency status and the imagined maneuverings to create this status, but I think this is beyond the point, and perhaps largely the fault of the very silly book, Currency Wars.  The RMB will not become a reserve currency because US or European policy makers decide to permit it.  It can only become a reserve currency when a large number of countries and companies decide it has the right amount of liquidity, security, and independence (and the last of those three is very unlikely) and if, for some reason, US monetary mismanagement forces people to look for an alternative.

Alaister, by net demand I simply mean demand less supply.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Tyaresun, I think in the short run deflation is almost a foregone conclusion, although I think whether or not it is in the longer run depends on the robustness of the financial system and on PBoC polices.  I am not sure devaluation will have much impact on deflation.  I am not smart enough to agree or disagree with Krugman’s argument, but I would say that there is certainly a very strong perception that protection might boost the domestic economy in the short term, and as far as I am concerned it doesn’t matter to China if this perception is right or wrong.  What matters is whether or not there will be moves towards protection.</p>
<p>Seatrus, I am not sure what you mean by overcapacity in the US.  As far as the global balance of payments goes the US is not an overcapacity country.  I am pretty sure that US and European policymakers are not worried about the RMB achieving reserve status, and I am very sure they would not be willing to see domestic unemployment rise to prevent that.  The RMB is very unlikely to become a reserve currency in the next few decades for a wide variety of factors.  For some reason a lot of people in Asia are obsessed with the importance of reserve currency status and the imagined maneuverings to create this status, but I think this is beyond the point, and perhaps largely the fault of the very silly book, Currency Wars.  The RMB will not become a reserve currency because US or European policy makers decide to permit it.  It can only become a reserve currency when a large number of countries and companies decide it has the right amount of liquidity, security, and independence (and the last of those three is very unlikely) and if, for some reason, US monetary mismanagement forces people to look for an alternative.</p>
<p>Alaister, by net demand I simply mean demand less supply.</p>
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		<title>By: Michael</title>
		<link>http://mpettis.com/2009/02/should-china-devalue-the-yuan/comment-page-1/#comment-786</link>
		<dc:creator>Michael</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 21 Feb 2009 06:49:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://mpettis.com/?p=301#comment-786</guid>
		<description>Twofish, it’s true that it is possible for China’s fiscal expansion to feed into greater consumption than production, and so cause an increase in net demand, but aside from all the discussion and proclamations over the past three years it is hard to find any evidence that this is happening.  On the contrary, total demand is growing and net demand is shrinking.  I am not sure I understand the rest of your comment.  Claiming that this shows the failure of economic theory is fine and good, and clearly it has become incredibly fashionable to claim the end of this or that economic theory, but I am not convinced that a very standard kind of financial crisis proves any such thing, and more importantly I am not sure I am part of this debate.

Dr. Loo, I think we need to worry a great deal about this.  My trip to Washington this week and my many earlier discussions with European and Asian policy types (and I plan to be in Brazil in May) convince me that many people in the world think China is moving in the wrong direction.  In my FT OpEd piece on Wednesday I try to argue that even though China seems to be behaving in a predatory fashion, this is not really the case.  China’s development model makes it very difficult for it to do the right thing in the short run.  As for the impact of the Eastern Europe “tsunami”, it is very worrying indeed, and it is likely to have a significant indirect impact by overwhelming European banks and, in so doing, putting more strains on European consumption.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Twofish, it’s true that it is possible for China’s fiscal expansion to feed into greater consumption than production, and so cause an increase in net demand, but aside from all the discussion and proclamations over the past three years it is hard to find any evidence that this is happening.  On the contrary, total demand is growing and net demand is shrinking.  I am not sure I understand the rest of your comment.  Claiming that this shows the failure of economic theory is fine and good, and clearly it has become incredibly fashionable to claim the end of this or that economic theory, but I am not convinced that a very standard kind of financial crisis proves any such thing, and more importantly I am not sure I am part of this debate.</p>
<p>Dr. Loo, I think we need to worry a great deal about this.  My trip to Washington this week and my many earlier discussions with European and Asian policy types (and I plan to be in Brazil in May) convince me that many people in the world think China is moving in the wrong direction.  In my FT OpEd piece on Wednesday I try to argue that even though China seems to be behaving in a predatory fashion, this is not really the case.  China’s development model makes it very difficult for it to do the right thing in the short run.  As for the impact of the Eastern Europe “tsunami”, it is very worrying indeed, and it is likely to have a significant indirect impact by overwhelming European banks and, in so doing, putting more strains on European consumption.</p>
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		<title>By: SnoDad</title>
		<link>http://mpettis.com/2009/02/should-china-devalue-the-yuan/comment-page-1/#comment-785</link>
		<dc:creator>SnoDad</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 21 Feb 2009 01:01:44 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://mpettis.com/?p=301#comment-785</guid>
		<description>U.S. Bank Nationalizations - http://www.capitalismgonewild.com/2009/02/bank-nationalization-for-citigroup-and_20.html</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>U.S. Bank Nationalizations &#8211; <a href="http://www.capitalismgonewild.com/2009/02/bank-nationalization-for-citigroup-and_20.html" rel="nofollow">http://www.capitalismgonewild.com/2009/02/bank-nationalization-for-citigroup-and_20.html</a></p>
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		<title>By: Glen M</title>
		<link>http://mpettis.com/2009/02/should-china-devalue-the-yuan/comment-page-1/#comment-783</link>
		<dc:creator>Glen M</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 20 Feb 2009 13:45:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://mpettis.com/?p=301#comment-783</guid>
		<description>Looking at the new NBER paper it seems that the recent appreciation of the Yuan was a result of appreciation of the Euro against the USD. The Yuan was not allowed to float, more like it was allowed to drift.

http://www.nber.org/papers/w14700

&quot;Our results -- with the benefit of more recent data and a technique that allows for changes in currency weights as well as changes in the rigidity of the peg -- suggest that the regime probably is not best described as a dollar peg with a trend appreciation.   Rather, the regime that has recently been in effect is better described as a basket peg with some weight on a non-dollar currency, the euro in particular.   By mid-2007, the weight on the dollar had fallen to 0.6 and the weight on the euro had risen correspondingly to 0.4.   The euro now apparently plays almost as important a role as the dollar.  It follows that the appreciation of the RMB against the dollar in 2007 was attributable to the appreciation of the euro against the dollar, not to a trend effective appreciation of the RMB.&quot;</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Looking at the new NBER paper it seems that the recent appreciation of the Yuan was a result of appreciation of the Euro against the USD. The Yuan was not allowed to float, more like it was allowed to drift.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w14700" rel="nofollow">http://www.nber.org/papers/w14700</a></p>
<p>&#8220;Our results &#8212; with the benefit of more recent data and a technique that allows for changes in currency weights as well as changes in the rigidity of the peg &#8212; suggest that the regime probably is not best described as a dollar peg with a trend appreciation.   Rather, the regime that has recently been in effect is better described as a basket peg with some weight on a non-dollar currency, the euro in particular.   By mid-2007, the weight on the dollar had fallen to 0.6 and the weight on the euro had risen correspondingly to 0.4.   The euro now apparently plays almost as important a role as the dollar.  It follows that the appreciation of the RMB against the dollar in 2007 was attributable to the appreciation of the euro against the dollar, not to a trend effective appreciation of the RMB.&#8221;</p>
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